Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for Slavery by Sebok, Anthony J.
Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law
LARC @ Cardozo Law
Articles Faculty
2004
Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for
Slavery
Anthony J. Sebok
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, sebok@yu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an
authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, please contact christine.george@yu.edu, carissa.vogel@yu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony J. Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for Slavery, 84 Boston University Law Review 1405 (2004).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/294
TWO CONCEPTS OF INJUSTICE IN RESTITUTION FOR 
SLAVERY 
ANTHONY J. SEBOK• 
I. THE RISE OF MASS RESTITUTION ............................. . ........................ 1405 
A. Holocaust Litigation ........ ........... .......... .... .. ................. .... .......... 1406 
B. Tobacco Litigation ...... ........ .. .......... .... ... .. .... ...... ..... ....... ..... ... .... 1410 
C. American Slavery and Mass Restitution ....... .. ........................... 1416 
II. THE RISKS OF MASS RESTITUTION ............. .... ... ... .. ............ . ........ ...... 1422 
A. Commodification .. ..... ....... ... ......... ..... .... ... ..................... ... ...... ... 1423 
B. Legal Fictions .. .. ........ ..... ....... .. ........... ........................ ............... 1427 
III. THE HARM OF "Loss OF CONTROL" AND COMMODIFICA TION ... ...... 1431 
CONCLUSION ... ..... ............ ....... .. .. .... ....... ................ ... .... ........ ... ......... . ........ ... 1441 
I. THE RISE OF MASS RESTITUTION 
Over the past decade, restitution has become an increasingly powerful tool 
for framing and resolving a number of highly politicized "mass" wrongs. 
Restitution - whose definition is not without controversy - has for centuries 
stood for "the obligation to account for certain benefits (though not others) 
obtained at the expense of another party." 1 Typically, those parties might have 
been one party who mistakenly received a payment and the second party for 
whom the payment was intended,2 or one party who wrote a book that violated 
a confidentiality agreement and the second party with whom that agreement 
was signed.3 These cases often involved direct, bipolar disputes that 
• Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful for the many useful comments I 
received on this paper from the participants of the symposium, "The Jurisprudence of 
Slavery Reparations," at the Boston University School of Law. I would like to note the 
contributions of my two symposium co-organizers, Hanoch Dagan and Keith Hylton. 
Invaluable research assistance was provided by Simon Lee, Brooklyn Law School, Class of 
2006. All errors remain my own responsibility. This research was supported by a Summer 
Research Grant from Brooklyn Law School. 
1 Andrew Kull , Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1192 (1995) 
[hereinafter Rationalizing Restitution]. 
2 See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Warner, 449 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) 
(requiring restitution from a woman in whose account a check for $23,000 was mistakenly 
deposited and who subsequently wrote checks drawing on the account); see also Andrew 
Kull, Defenses To Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 B.U. L. REv. 919, 920 (2001) 
( discussing the merits of a restitution claim based on mistaken payment). 
3 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 523 (1980) (holding that a former CIA agent 
breached his fiduciary obligation to the U.S. Government by publishing a book in violation 
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overlapped with contract and property disputes, although it has been noted that 
restitution currently lacks the doctrinal coherence found in other areas of 
private law.4 
In the 1990s, two very different strands of cases came together that 
confirmed restitution's potential for forcing powerful corporate defendants to 
acknowledge - or at least address - their past actions. One line of cases 
involved suits by Holocaust survivors and others forced into slavery by the 
Nazi government for the restitution of property that had unjustly enriched 
contemporary corporations and banks.5 The other line of cases involved suits 
by forty-six states against the tobacco industry for restitution of funds that the 
industry acquired unjustly because the states, it was argued, had paid for health 
care costs that should have been borne by the industry.6 
Both the Holocaust and tobacco liti$ation are examples of a phenomenon I 
have described elsewhere under the rubric of "mass restitution. "7 The basic 
definition of a mass restitution claim is that it is a suit for restitution brought 
against a private party (usually a corporation) for the monetary equivalent of 
property or labor taken from a large number of people during a period when 
the wrongdoing leading to the unjust enrichment was accepted by the society 
in which it occurred (or at least by those who controlled that society). A 
further feature of the mass restitution suits is that they are a result of a change 
in attitudes within society itself - not only is the earlier period recognized as 
wrong, but it is viewed as a period of great wrongdoing that was made possible 
because of the breakdown of the political system, a fact which helps justify, in 
the eyes of later generations, the use oflaw. 
A. Holocaust Litigation 
The Holocaust mass restitution litigation came about incrementally, each 
stage building on the last. The first wave of litigation began in the United 
States with the filing of a class action lawsuit naming a number of Swiss banks 
as defendants in 1996. 8 The class plaintiffs claimed the Swiss banks were 
of an agreement requiring pre-publication clearance and requiring that the profits derived 
thereby be held in constructive trust to avoid the unjust enrichment of the author). 
4 See Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 1, at 1194-95 (discussing the adverse 
consequences of the lack of certainty over the doctrine of restitution). Kull goes further: 
"To put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not 
know what restitution is." Id. at 1195; see also Doug Rendleman, Common law Restitution 
in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REv. 
847, 892 (1999) (quoting Kull and describing the law ofrestitution as a lost art). 
5 See irifra notes 9-34 and accompanying text. 
6 See irifra notes 35-65 and accompanying text. 
7 See Anthony Sebok, A Brief History of Mass Restitution Litigation in the United States, 
in CALLING POWER To ACCOUNT: LAW 'S RESPONSE To PAST INJUSTICE (D. Dyzenhaus & M. 
Moran eds., forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter A Brief History] (manuscript on file with 
author). 
8 See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
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holding thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands, of "dormant accounts" that 
the banks knew belonged to Jews killed in the Holocaust, and which the banks 
were wrongfully withholding from the heirs of the account-holders.9 Soon, 
other plaintiffs filed suits and the grounds for the suits widened. 10 The 
plaintiffs claimed that the Nazis looted property, including gold from the 
bodies of Holocaust victims, and sold it to the Swiss banks during the war. The 
Plaintiffs also claimed that the profits of slave labor were similarly "laundered" 
through the Swiss banks, and that by actively cooperating with the Nazi 
regime, the banks aided and abetted human rights violations including slave 
labor and genocide. 11 
The Swiss bank cases illustrate how fluid the concept of unjust enrichment 
can be in a claim involving massive and systemic human rights violations. The 
central claim was that the banks took money and never returned it. 12 The heart 
of the cases was, therefore, the 'dormant accounts' themselves. Further claims 
concerning property that the Nazis took and transferred to the Swiss banks 
were an extension of the dormant account claim - the wrong at issue was the 
wrongful possession of someone else's property. These claims were 
essentially actions for restitution based in replevin, in which the banks held the 
proceeds of the wrongfully taken property in constructive trust on behalf of the 
accounts' true owners. 13 
The Swiss bank cases also included some claims for restitution of the value 
of slave labor itself: 14 and the settlement of the cases ultimately included a 
component of compensation for this slave labor. 15 Technically, these were 
claims for quantum meruit, or the value of plaintiffs' labor that unjustly 
enriched the defendants. 16 Such actions stood on a footing of restitution rather 
than replevin, in part because the claims were not for the return of anything to 
( determining the fairness of a settlement agreement settling class action lawsuits brought by 
Holocaust survivors). 
9 Id. at 157. 
10 Id. at 141-42. 
11 Id. In 1998, the banks and the plaintiffs settled the suit for $1 .25 billion. The 
settlement, which Judge Edward Korman approved, created a fund which allowed "Victims 
or Targets of Nazi Persecution" to collect some form of reparations. The claimants included 
those who could prove that they or their families had deposited assets with the banks. The 
settlement also included payments of between $500 to $1500 to claimants who could prove 
they were forced to perform slave labor for the Nazis, and $145 million to existing charities 
to provide reparations to the community of victims for the looted property that had been 
laundered through the banks. Id. at 142-43. 
12 Id. at 151 (recounting the findings of the Volcker committee, which determined "that 
approximately 54,000 Swiss bank accounts appear[ed] to have a 'probable' or 'possible' 
connection to a Holocaust victim"). 
13 See DAN B. DoBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES§ 4.2(2) (2d ed. 1993). 
14 In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 141. 
15 Id. at 148. 
16 See DOBBS, supra note 13, § 4.2(3). 
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which the plaintiffs had title. Rather, the plaintiffs asked the court to use its 
equitable powers to remedy a wrong that resulted in the defendants' unjust 
enrichment. 17 
In 1998, many of the same lawyers who were handling the Swiss Bank 
litigation initiated a new set of lawsuits demanding reparations for victims of 
Nazi activities. 18 They filed these suits against corporations that used slave 
labor during World War 11. 19 The legal claims were both similar to, and quite 
different from, the Swiss Bank claims. They were similar in that they focused 
on private corporations that had taken advantage of the horrible acts of the 
Nazi government. For example, the first such lawsuit was against an American 
company, Ford, on the theory that Ford's German subsidiary benefited from 
slave labor organized by the Nazis with Ford's cooperation.2° Following the 
Ford lawsuit, fifty-six more lawsuits were filed in California, Illinois, Indiana, 
New Jersey, and New York.21 They differed from the Swiss Bank lawsuits in 
that any connection with real property was now almost completely forgotten. 
These new lawsuits were not for replevin (the defendant firms never received 
any real property) but for quantum meruit (the labor taken and, more 
importantly, the profit created through that labor).22 
As with the Swiss bank cases, the defendant firms mounted a defense based 
on numerous technical objections. These defenses fell primarily into two 
classes. The first might be described as the "political question" defense -
claiming that the reparations claims arose as result of activities by Germans 
while Germany was at war with the United States; therefore, the claims were, 
for purposes of American jurisdiction at least, subsumed under the Executive's 
power to make and en.force treaties. 23 The defendant firms' second defense 
17 At an earlier time, these claims would have been made in assumpsit. "Restitution at 
law proceeded mainly in two large streams. The first dealt with cases in which plaintiff had 
legal title . . . . [The second] derived from the writ of assumpsit. This kind of claim dealt 
with cases in which the plaintiff could not assert title . . .. " Id. § 4 .2(1) (emphasis in 
original). 
18 Compare In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 139 with lwanowa v. 
Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 424 (D.N.J. 1999). Professor Burt Neuborne at New 
York University Law School has played a particularly active role in lawsuits seeking 
reparations for forced labor during World War II. See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST 
JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS 59 (2003). 
19 See, e.g., Iwanowa, 67 F . Supp. 2d at 433-34 (recounting how Ford, operating through 
Ford Werke, employed slave labor in Germany during World War II). 
20 Id. at 445 ( describing the plaintiffs' allegation that Ford was a de facto state actor). 
21 BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 64-65 (discussing lawsuits against German and Austrian 
companies for employing "slave labor during World War II"). 
22 See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252-53 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(describing the plaintiffs ' claims as, inter alia, claims of unjust enrichment seeking 
"restitution of ... the value of slave and/or enforced labor"). 
23 See BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 347 n.27 (listing the German companies' procedural 
objections). 
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might be described as the 'statute of limitations' defense. They argued that, 
assuming the suits were not barred because they implicated political questions, 
and assuming that the plaintiffs could establish jurisdiction under the relevant 
statutes, the suits were time-barred because the plaintiffs had waited too long 
to bring their claims.24 Unlike the Swiss bank cases, in which the judge 
delayed answering the defendants' motions to dismiss, in the German slave 
labor cases, a few judges actually ruled on the defendants' dispositive motions. 
Judge Debevoise, of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit in Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG 
because, for the most part, he accepted the political question defense. 25 In 
another case, Judge Greeneway, from the same district, dismissed the 
plaintiffs ' suit in Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co. because, for the most part, he 
accepted the statute of limitations defense.26 All told, five lawsuits were 
dismissed by November 1999.27 
Despite experiencing some success in court, on December 19, 1999, the 
defendants struck a deal with the lead plaintiffs in all the slave labor suits. 28 
The plaintiffs designed the settlement to end all current litigation and ensure 
that no new litigation would occur.29 They agreed that, if the plaintiffs 
voluntarily abandoned their lawsuits and did not object to the dismissal of all 
similar suits, the German Parliament would charter, with the full cooperation 
of various German industry associations, a private, ten billion Deutschmark 
"German Fund Foundation," and that thjs foundation would pay reparations to 
individuals and organizations who qualified under the principles established in 
the agreement. 30 Despite prevailing in court, the German defendant 
corporations were willing to pay approximately $5.2 billion for "legal 
peace."31 Why they chose to do so is a matter of some speculation. Some 
have opined that the Swiss experience made political and social pressure more 
effective. 32 Before the first suits were dismissed, New York City was 
24 Id. 
25 65 F. Supp. 2d 248,285 (D.N.J. 1999). 
26 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,491 (D.N.J. 1999). The lawyers for the plaintiff were confident 
that these district court decisions would be overturned on appeal. For a vigorous statement 
of their views, see Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in 
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. I, 19 (2000). 
27 See BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 74. 
28 See id. at 79. 
29 See id. at 80-81. 
30 Roger Cohen, Payback for Nazis' Slave Labour Approved: Claimants Expected to Get 
About $2,500, GLOBE & MAIL, March 24, 2000, at Al I (reporting the details of the 
settlement agreement). 
31 See STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND 
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II 257 (2003) (quoting Roger Witten, the 
German firms' lead lawyer in settlement negotiations); see also BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 
83-88. 
32 See BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 74-77. 
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considering sanctions similar to those that had been threatened against the 
Swiss banks. 33 After the suits were dismissed, legislation was introduced in 
Congress threatening to overturn the decisions. 34 
B. Tobacco Litigation 
The state tobacco litigation came after forty years of mostly ineffective 
attempts to hold the tobacco companies responsible for manufacturing a 
defective product. 35 While some earlier suits alleged that cigarettes were 
defective for no other reason than that they were associated with disease, most 
suits focused on the failure of the tobacco industry to warn the public about the 
risks of tobacco use, ranging from the health effects of smoking to the 
addictive properties of nicotine.36 Despite a handful of promising victories -
including short-lived certification of a national products liability class action -
personal injury claims arising from the manufacturing and marketing of 
tobacco products were not succeeding. 37 Not only had they failed to generate 
enough liability judgments to force significant changes in the industry's 
conduct, but the litigation had not produced a dramatic or powerful 
breakthrough in the industry's traditional defenses, which included their 
steadfast insistence that they had not concealed or suppressed scientific 
33 Political pressure was undoubtedly placed on the Swiss banks to settle the suits. 
Senator Alfonse D' Amato, the Republican Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, 
held hearings on the dormant Swiss bank accounts. New York and California's 
comptrollers also threatened to withhold business from the Swiss banks and their American 
subsidiaries unless the banks resolved the claims against them. See David E. Sanger, 
McCall and State Dept. Clash on Sanctions Against Swiss Over Gold, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 
1998, at BI (reporting on threatened sanctions against the Swiss banks). 
34 See BAZYLER, supra note 26, at 78. 
35 See Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave Of Tobacco Litigation, in REGULATING 
TOBACCO 176, 178 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001 ). 
36 Id. at 184-85 (stating that "[t]hrough two waves of tobacco litigation, plaintiffs based 
their claims on the industry's failure to warn of the health risks of smoking .. . . [N]icotine 
addition, as a focal point ... had been tentatively explored [by a few plaintiffs' lawyers] in 
the waning days of the second wave, but that had never been developed into the centerpiece 
of the litigation" (emphasis in original)). 
37 
"From 1954 to 1994, a period of some forty years, approximately 813 claims were 
filed by private citizens in tort actions in state courts against tobacco companies. Only twice 
did courts find in favor of the plaintiffs, and both of these decisions were substantively 
reversed on appeal." Arthur B. Lafrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public 
Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 190 (2000) (citing Elsa F. Kramer, Waiting To Exhale: 
Tobacco Lawyers are Getting Burned by Damaging Industry Revelations. Can They Rise 
From the Ashes?, REs GESTAE, May 1996, at 20; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. 
Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), ajf'd in part and rev 'din part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), ajf'd 
in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 
134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955), rev 'd, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), amended by 370 
F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966)). 
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research establishing the risks of smoking. 38 
In 1994, Mississippi began a Medicaid restitution action against the tobacco 
companies.39 The suit, which was filed in chancery, sought restitution 
claiming the tobacco companies were unjustly enriched because the 
Mississippi's Medicaid payments saved the tobacco companies the money they 
ought to have paid to smokers.40 Within a year, scores of other states filed 
similar lawsuits alleging much the same claim of unjust enrichment.41 The 
Mississippi lawsuit settled in July of 1997 for $3.6 billion to be paid by the 
tobacco companies over twenty-five years.42 Florida settled its suit against the 
industry in August 1997 for $11.3 billion,43 Texas settled its suit in January 
1998 for $15.3 billion44 and Minnesota finally settled its suit for $6.1 billion on 
the eve before the jury was to render its verdict. Following this trend, the 
Attorneys General from the remaining states negotiated a $206 billion global 
industry settlement in reimbursement for Medicaid and related health care 
costs.45 
The state reimbursement claims shifted the legal terrain, which had allowed 
the industry almost a half-century of legal immunity for its actions. While the 
state claims were not exclusively based on an effort to get the industry to repay 
38 See Rabin, supra note 35, at 184-85 (recounting the tobacco industry's efforts to 
conceal the health effects of smoking, and describing the process by which these efforts 
were exposed in the 1990s). 
39 See Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in 
State Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 563, 566 (200 I). 
40 See Rabin, supra note 35, at 189-93 ( discussing lawsuits filed by states seeking 
reimbursement of health care costs). 
41 Not all states chose to follow Mississippi's legal theory, however. Minnesota' s 
Attorney General filed a suit in 1994 alleging that the tobacco companies violated 
Minnesota's consumer protection statutes designed to shield consumers from industry fraud 
and deception. See Gary L. Wilson & Jason A. Gillmer, Minnesota 's Tobacco Case: 
Recovering Damages Without Individual Proof of Reliance under Minnesota 's Consumer 
Protection Statutes, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 567, 568 (1999). These acts were "the 
Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, the Unlawful Trade Practices Act, the False Statement 
in Advertising statute, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act." Id. at 569. 
Minnesota argued that the consumer fraud statute gave standing to the state to recover 
Medicaid expenses that accrued because of consumer fraud. Id. at 574. 
42 Milo Geyelin, Mississippi Becomes First State to Settle Against Big Tobacco 
Companies, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1997, at B8. 
43 Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers Agree to Settle Florida Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
1997, at Al. 
44 Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Firms to Pay Texas $15.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1998, 
atA3. 
45 In the Settlement, the tobacco companies agreed to pay roughly $206 billion by 2025 
to forty-six states. This payout was in addition to the separate agreements with Mississippi, 
Florida, Texas, and Minnesota (totaling $40 billion). See Milo Geyelin, Top Tobacco Firms 
Agree to Pay States Up to $206 Billion in 25-Year Settlement, WALL ST. J. , Nov. 16, 1998, 
at A3 . 
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or reimburse the states, the unjust enrichment dimension of the litigation 
strategy gave the states' litigation strategy its shape. The architects of the 
Mississippi case, for example, shifted the focus from the harms smoking 
caused to smokers to the harms smoking caused to the health care system. 46 
They did this for two reasons. First, they believed that by focusing on the 
losses suffered by the state, the question of smokers' own conduct would be 
mooted, removing the single most powerful weapon in the tobacco industry's 
defensive arsenal.47 Second, and just as important, by making the state the 
plaintiff, all issues of class certification raised in the context of earlier failed 
attempts at personal injury class action litigation were mooted as well, because 
instead of millions of plaintiffs, there would be only one. Concerns over 
common issues of fact which doomed earlier class actions, and the 
predominance and superiority tests of federal and state class action statutes 
would no longer bar the lawsuits. A state could argue that although the 
question of whether a state could recover against the tobacco defendants might 
involve contested factual issues resolvable only through the testimony of 
potentially numerous individual smokers, because those smokers were not 
parties to the suit, their due process rights were not at issue and there was no 
Castano-type numerosity or superiority barrier to the state's suits.48 
The move towards the single, unitary plaintiff came with some risks. Even 
if, as lawyers for the states believed they could demonstrate, after exhaustive 
discovery, the tobacco companies had lied to smokers and sold them a product 
which was deliberately designed to cause injury and addiction, what standing 
did the states have to bring a claim? There are a number of ways of 
establishing standing. The most obvious would have been for the states to 
have brought suit under the equivalent of "contractual" subrogation, a right 
that they had under both state and federal law.49 However, given the 
46 See Rabin, supra note 35, at 189-93. 
47 
"[T]he states could not successfully frame their claims against the tobacco companies 
in terms of either the traditional tort doctrine of subrogation or the codified version of the 
doctrine that allows most state governments to seek reimbursement for medical 
expenditures. Subrogation ... would put the states in the shoes of smokers - who, as we 
know, had uniformly failed in their lawsuits against the tobacco companies up to that point." 
Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State 
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 563, 571 (2001). Or, as 
Attorney General Michael Moore put it: "This time the industry cannot claim that a smoker 
knew full well what risks he took each time he lit up. The state of Mississippi never smoked 
a cigarette. Yet it has paid the medical expenses of thousands of indigent smokers who 
did." Mike Moore, The States Are Just Trying to Take Care of Sick Citizens and Protect 
Children, 83 A.B.A. J. 53, 53 (1997). 
48 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing class 
certification on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed the predominance and superiority tests). 
49 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 367-a(2)(b) (Gould 2004) (subrogating social 
service officials for medical care costs); 18 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 542.1 
(2004) (subrogating social service officials for smokers' medical expenditures); see also 
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shortcomings of subrogation, the states turned to other legal theories. 50 
Some states tried to frame their demand for reimbursement as a claim of 
indemnity.51 The classic case of indemnification occurs in tort, when one party 
who has a duty to an injured victim pays that victim ( either as a result of 
judgment or settlement) and then sues another party who also owed a duty to 
the victim for the entirety of the amount paid to the victim. 52 The duty to 
indemnify cannot arise just because the payor "volunteers" to satisfy an 
obligation owed by another.53 Beyond this, the common law in most states 
does not permit indemnification except under very limited circumstances. 54 
Even if the claim for indemnification could be made sensible as a matter of 
doctrine, it would still have put the states right back where they did not want to 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-120 (2003) (subrogating Maryland officials); 62 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 1409 (2004) (subrogating Pennsylvania officials). 
50 Subrogation claims applied to tobacco litigation would be vulnerable to the same 
defenses that the industry could have raised in the context of individual smoker's suits. The 
most significant of these would have been a defense based on the statute of limitations, 
which would have begun to run presumably at different times based on each smoker's 
knowledge and a defense based on the fault of the smokers or their assumption of risk. See 
William H. Pryor Jr. et al., Report of the Task Force on Tobacco Litigation Submitted to 
Governor James and Attorney General Sessions, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 575, 585-86 (I 997). 
51 Those states that claimed a right to indemnity simply misunderstood the meaning of 
that claim. As stated in section seventy-six of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION, 
indemnification may be demanded where "[a] person who, in whole or in part, has 
discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should 
have been discharged by the other .. .. " RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI 
CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS§ 76 (1935). 
52 See w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 51 (5th ed. 
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]. 
53 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 708-09 (3rd ed. 2002). This is 
made explicit in the draft RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 26 (Council Draft No. 3, 2001) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION] . It 
clearly states that indemnification is a duty that arises between parties who breached a joint 
duty that resulted in an injury to the victim, the compensation of which was provided by the 
one party who now seeks indemnification from the other. See id. ("A claim to indemnity or 
contribution arises when the claimant has discharged all or part of a common liability. A 
claim under this Section must be distinguished, therefore, from the analogous claim that 
arises when A and B owe independent duties to a third party, C, or when A, acting with 
adequate justification, renders a performance to C for which B would have been liable to C 
directly"). 
54 For example, in Iowa, if the parties are not joint tortfeasors, common law 
indemnification is permitted only where there is an express contract, vicarious liability, or 
the breach of an independent duty between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. See Daniels 
v. Hi-Way Truck Equip., 505 N .W.2d 485, 490 (Iowa 1993). For this reason, Iowa' s 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the dismissal of the indemnity claim. State ex rel. 
Miller v. Philip Morris, Inc., 577 N .W.2d 401 , 406 (Iowa 1998); see also Maryland v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., No. 96122017, 1997 WL 540913, at *9-11 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 21 , 1997). 
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be - in the position of having to prove that the tobacco companies owed a duty 
to compensate the smokers on whose behalf the states had expended funds for 
medical care.55 The tobacco industry thus could argue that indemnification for 
the entire class of smokers who received medical care could not be presumed, 
but would have to be proven on an individual, case-by-case basis, thus putting 
the states back in the same place they would have been in had they pursued 
multiple subrogation claims. 
For this reason, many of the states opted to describe their reimbursement 
claims as demands for restitution based on unjust enrichment. 56 In a number of 
state in which unjust enrichment claims were challenged on motions to dismiss 
by the tobacco companies, courts found that the alleged benefit conferred by 
the states onto the tobacco companies was either too speculative to be 
actionable or the result of mere volunteerism. 57 In a number of other states, 
such as Mississippi, the tobacco companies' legal challenges never received 
substantive review by any court (despite extensive briefing) before the cases 
settled. 58 As Douglas Rendleman pointed out, the unjust enrichment claims by 
the states were an attempt to establish that the funds the tobacco companies 
never spent for tort compensation was a benefit unjustly conferred on them by 
the states, which had, by offering medical care for free, somehow eliminated 
that liability. 59 The weakest part of this argument was that its status assumed 
the states had stepped in to partially pay (or mitigate) an obligation that the 
tobacco companies would have been obliged to pay, which is exactly the issue 
that the state had hoped to avoid when it abandoned the subrogation 
argument. 60 
55 The existence of an obligation between the indernnitee and the victim who received 
money from the indernnitor is a prerequisite for the existence of a duty to indemnify 
between the indernnitor and the indernnitee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, 
supra note 53, § 26. 
56 In many states this claim was barred under the doctrine that unjust enrichment is not 
available if any other remedy is available. This was the holding of courts in Iowa, 
Maryland, Washington, and West Virginia. 
57 See, e.g., Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, Inc., No. CL 71048 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 1997), 
http://stic.neu.edu/Ia/dec8-26.htm (last visited on November 6, 2004); Philip Morris, 1997 
WL 540913, at *9-11 ; Washington v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA, 1996 
WL 931316, at *9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996). 
58 Professor Douglas Rendleman' s exhaustive review of the claims in equity made by the 
lawyers working for the state takes a dim view of the cause of action from the perspective of 
Mississippi law. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco 
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes? 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 850-51 (1999). 
59 Id. at 852-55 (explaining Mississippi's theory of why it was owed restitution by the 
tobacco companies). 
60 Professor Rendleman further explained that: 
The plaintitrs first step in unjust enrichment is showing defendant's enrichment as a 
benefit. The tobacco companies argue they were not enriched. A defendant must have 
' economic benefit' as a prerequisite to restitution . . .. Only if the tobacco companies 
were liable to the smokers for damages would the State's Medicaid payments to the 
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Yet, like the Holocaust litigation, despite the absence of strong ( or even 
persuasive) legal support for the admittedly unusual use of restitution law in 
the states' campaign against the tobacco industry, the defendants settled.61 
One can only speculate on the industry's motivations. As with the Swiss 
banks, the litigation itself brought out information about the past practices of 
the tobacco industry that had not been available to the public. Some of it, such 
as the vast trove of documents that were pried out of the industry by aggressive 
discovery conducted by the private attorneys representing the states, was a 
direct result of the litigation. 62 Other documents, such as those produced by 
whistle-blowers, received much more attention in the media than they probably 
would have otherwise because of the litigation, which gave both context and 
credence to their claims.63 As with the Holocaust litigation, the information 
generated by the lawyers caught the eye of politicians.64 Finally, as with the 
smokers be an 'economic benefit' to the tobacco companies. The tobacco companies 
would have been enriched if the State had paid an obligation the tobacco companies 
really owed. A restitution-indemnity plaintiff who discharges a duty to the defendant 
owed may recover from the defendant . . . . The State cannot recover its payments for 
the smokers' health care costs from the tobacco companies as restitution-indemnity 
unless the tobacco companies were liable to the smokers. 
Id. at 899 (internal citations omitted); see also Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, 
Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 374-76 nn.90-
91 (2000) (disputing that any type of indemnity or unjust enrichment claim could have 
been made by the states and acknowledging the difficulties for the states posed by the 
affirmative defenses available to the tobacco companies in case subrogation claims were 
brought); Tiffany S. Griggs, Comment, Medicaid Reimbursement From Tobacco 
Manufacturers: ls The States' Legal Position Equitable?, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 799,800 
( 1998) ("argu[ing] that that the states should not be able to obtain special advantages [in 
the Medicaid reimbursement litigation] which are not available to individual claimants"). 
61 The Minnesota case settled after the judge instructed the jury but before they could 
begin deliberating. According to one news report, the jurors felt angry at having been 
usurped and were also surprised by the size of the settlement, suggesting that they would not 
have awarded such a large sum. See David Phelps & Deborah Caulfield Ryback, Jury 
Instructions Spurred Settlement Talks, STAR TRIB., Nov. 25, 1998, at ID. 
62 See Michael V. Ciresi, et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the 
Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 477, 479 (1999) (discussing the 
tobacco companies' effort to conceal documents and how discovery in the Minnesota 
lawsuit "resulted in the production of approximately thirty-five million pages of internal 
industry documents"). 
63 In the early l 990's, Merrell Williams, a paralegal working for the firm representing 
tobacco giant Brown & Williamson, procured documents containing evidence of the 
industry's knowledge of the health risks and addictive nature of smoking. Jeffrey Wigand, 
the head of research and development at Brown & Williamson, was fired in 1993 after years 
of battling the company's refusal to acknowledge publicly the health risks of smoking and 
nicotine's addictive qualities. Both Wigand's and Williams's revelations appeared in the 
New York Times , the Wall Street Journal, and Congressional hearings on tobacco, and ended 
up in the hands of anti-tobacco activists. Rabin, supra note 35, at 184. 
64 The question of whether the CEOs of the seven major tobacco companies had lied to 
Congress during hearings in 1994 was revived once the states uncovered evidence they 
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Holocaust litigation, it is possible that at some point the managers of the 
tobacco companies decided that the costs of the settlement would be worth 
paying in exchange for putting the issue behind them. As many commentators 
have noted, the master settlement agreement ("MSA") provided the industry 
with a variety of benefits (including, perhaps, the creation of a barrier to new 
entrants into their market) with a relatively modest cost, since the $240 billion 
paid out would be collected from smokers over twenty-five years much like a 
tax privately negotiated between the government and the firms who would 
collect the tax on their behalf.65 
C. American Slavery and Mass Restitution 
In 2002, a number of lawsuits were filed in state and federal court that 
demanded some form of compensation from corporations that benefited from 
slavery.66 The team of lawyers who brought the first suit in Brooklyn, New 
York, spoke about the suit in terms of reparations for wrongdoing. Deadria 
Farmer-Paellmann, one of the architects of the recent strategy of suing 
corporations for unjust enrichment, said of the suits, "[t]he perpetrators of the 
crimes committed against Africans are still here . . . . They profited from 
stealing people and labor, torturing and raping women to breed children."67 
The purpose of the suit was to secure "atonement" from those who had done 
wrong to the plaintiffs. 68 
It is hard to know how literally to take statements like this. It would seem 
they reflect at least some of the lawyers' true motivations and the motivations 
of those class members who support the suit. There is a potential disjunction 
between the language of punishment and atonement and the structure of 
restitution law. Typically, as noted above, restitution's main purpose is not to 
believed proved the industry knew nicotine was addictive when the CEOs told Congress is 
was not. See Mark Curriden, Texas to Subpoena Ex-Tobacco CEOs: They Denied Addictive 
Nature of Nicotine in '94, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 1997, at IA. 
65 See DAGAN & WHITE, supra note 60, at 379-80. See generally W. KIP VISCUS!, 
SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL (2002). 
66 See, e.g., Hurdle v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-4653 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 17, 
2003); Porter v. Lloyds of London, No. 02-CV-6180 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 29, 2002); 
Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-9180 (E.D. La. filed Sept. 3, 2003); Barber v. 
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-2084 (D.N.J. filed May 2, 2002); Carrington v. FleetBoston 
Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-1863 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 26, 2002); Farmer-Paellmann v. 
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-1862 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 26, 2002); Hurdle v. 
FleetBoston Fin. Corp. , No. CGC-02-0412388 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 10, 2002). 
Almost all of these suits have been consolidated through a federal MDL (Multidistrict 
Litigation) order in the Northern District of Illinois. See In re African-Am. Slave 
Descendants Litig. , 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 2004). The cases were dismissed 
without prejudice on January 26, 2004. Id. at 1075. 
67 Lewis Beale, Seeking Justice for Slavery 's Sins, L.A. TIMES, April 22, 2002, pt. 5, at I 
(quoting Deadria Farmer-Paellmann). 
68 Id. 
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punish wrongdoers or to force wrongdoers to compensate victims for the 
wrongful injuries they have caused. Those functions are better served by 
public law (either criminal or regulatory) or tort law.69 Restitution's function, 
as Andrew Kull has put it, "is not to compensate the plaintiff, but to strip the 
defendant of a wrongful gain ... [and] disgorgement, prima facie at least, does 
not punish."70 
Some of the rhetorical force behind all of the mass restitution suits discussed 
in this section comes from the normative resonance of Ms. Farmer-
Paellmann' s language. The enslavement of Africans by Europeans, their 
transport to the Americas, and the treatment that they and subsequent 
generations suffered until emancipation was immoral and tortious. The human 
rights of the men, women and children enslaved were violated, and they 
suffered, in the language of tort, untold "wrongful losses" as a result of a wide 
range of acts, ranging from battery to false imprisonment to the negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.71 Against the proper defendants, 
the idea of some kind of legal action designed to punish and to secure 
compensation seems not only sensible, but also compelling. 
However, as with the Holocaust and tobacco litigation, the structure of the 
slavery litigation is grounded much less on criminal or compensatory claims 
than on restitutionary claims. The reasons for this in the context of the 
Holocaust suits was that the negotiated end of the Second World War had 
settled the question of political and criminal responsibility for all the acts of the 
Nazis and their agents.72 The treaties signed by the new German government 
and the trials conducted by the Allies were the only punishment states were 
going to visit upon the parties responsible for the atrocities that would later 
form the foundation of the Holocaust restitution suits. 73 The main 
compensation demanded in the Holocaust cases was for contract damages. 74 
69 On this latter point, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective 
Justice, in I THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 12 (2000). 
70 Andrew Kull, Restitution 's Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 19 (2003). 
71 For an extensive review of the "torts of slavery," see Keith Hylton, Slavery and Tort 
law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (2004). 
72 See A Brief History, supra note 7, at 21-22. 
73 By 1998, Germany (the Federal Republic) had paid at least $60 billion in reparations 
to the various parties entitled under the treaties described above. See BAZYLER, supra note 
18, at 291. This figure is consistent with the numbers provided by Judge Debevoise in 
Burger-Fischer v. De Gussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 270 (D.N.J. 1999). The Allies dealt 
with corporate criminal liability after the war. The United States Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg prosecuted two bankers. Karl Rasche was acquitted of the charge that he had 
provided loans for the construction of concentration camps, while Emil Puhl was convicted 
of the charge that he had actively participated in the theft of gold from the victims of the 
camp. See Anita Ramasastry, Banks And Human Rights: Should Swiss Banks Be Liable For 
Lending To South Africa's Apartheid Government?, FINDLAW, at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20020703.html (July 3, 2002). 
74 
"Plaintiffs' German law claims were garden-variety contract and unjust enrichment 
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To the extent that tort-like damages were mentioned, it was in connection with 
the suffering that resulted from the confinement of the slave laborers, not the 
evils that formed the main core of the Holocaust - the campaign to exterminate 
certain populations on the basis of their religion, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation. 75 In the tobacco litigation, for reasons that should be depressingly 
familiar to American audiences, there has never been a serious effort by the 
states or the federal government to penalize the tobacco industry for the 
wrongdoing alleged in the states' restitution suits. 76 Because the states did not 
want to encounter the same problems with affirmative defenses that had 
defeated so many previous suits for personal injury, the restitution suits 
carefully did not depend on proof that the tobacco industry caused wrongful 
losses, only that it had acted wrongfully and thereby profited.77 
The Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in the consolidated slavery lawsuit 
reflects the same emphasis on restitution seen in earlier mass restitution 
cases.78 The plaintiffs sued only corporate defendants, not the United States, 
nor any single state, nor any individuals.79 They describe fourteen counts, 
claims, seeking compensation for the reasonable value of their coerced services and 
appropriate compensation for suffering caused by wretched conditions of confinement." 
Burt Neuborne, Litigation in a Free Society: Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of 
Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795,814 (2002). 
75 There was, in addition to the contract and unjust enrichment claims, a demand for 
damages based on the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"). This cause of action was premised 
on the violation of the norm of customary international law prohibiting the enslavement of 
conquered populations and on the Nuremberg principles barring the commission of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. My criticism of mass restitution litigation does not 
have any connection with the attempt by the plaintiffs to use human rights laws to address 
mass historical wrongs such as slave labor. The current African American slavery suit also 
raises, as a separate basis for corporate liability, the ATCA. The problems with using the 
ATCA in these sorts of cases are beyond the scope of this article. See BAZYLER, supra note 
18, at 177 ( explaining that the attempt to use the ATCA as the basis for jurisdiction for some 
of the suits arising from Holocaust). 
76 The one exception to this history of federal inaction is the lawsuit filed by the Justice 
Department during the Clinton Administration in 1999, United States v. Philip Morris Inc. 
The government sued for: restitution, under the Medical Care Recovery Act (MCRA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (2004), and the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) provisions, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395y (2004); and disgorgement under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2004). The restitution claims were 
dismissed in 2000 and the RICO claims set for trial in November 2004. See United States v. 
Philip Morris Inc., C.V. No. 99-2496, 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 , 134 (D.D.C. 2000) (motion to 
dismiss granted in part and denied in part). 
77 Id. at 135 (explaining that basis for the government's lawsuits). 
78 See First Consolidated and Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 8, In re African-
Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 755 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (MDL No. 1491), 
http://www.aetna.com/legal_issues/suits/06-26-03_complaint.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 
2004) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint]. 
19 Id. 12(a). 
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ranging from crimes against humanity to violations of the consumer protection 
laws of five different states. 80 The dominant relief requested for each count 
was the same: "an accounting of profits earned from slave labor, a constructive 
trust imposed on such profits, restitution, equitable disgorgement, and punitive 
damages."81 With the exception of the demand for punitive damages, the 
remedies demanded are typical of restitution ( especially the demand for an 
accounting of profits) and focus almost exclusively on the identification of and 
return of the wealth the corporate defendants gained illegally and still hold.82 
The focus on corporate defendants, as in the Holocaust litigation, is 
probably a result of certain contingent legal considerations. In Cato v. United 
States, the Ninth Circuit held that the United States Government could not be 
sued for slavery.83 The suit was rejected on the ground that it did not satisfy 
the requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the law that sets out the 
conditions under which the federal government has consented to be sued. 84 
More specifically, in addition to statute of limitations problems, the court 
pointed out that the plaintiffs lacked standing, since their claim essentially was 
that the U.S. Government had failed to take certain steps to positively enforce 
the Thirteenth Amendment. 85 While the Cato decision has been discussed 
frequently since it was issued, few commentators have argued that it is legally 
infirm.86 The states are also probably immune from suit for similar reasons. 
Private individuals are obviously unattractive targets for suit for two 
reasons. First, those directly responsible for the human rights violations and 
the torts committed before emancipation are not available to be sued.87 
80 The fourteen causes of action alleged in the First Amended Complaint were 
Conspiracy, Accounting, Crime Against Humanity, Piracy, Intentional Infliction of Emotion 
Distress (for Rape, Breeding, Torture, Abuse, and the Spread of Racist Beliefs), Conversion, 
Unjust Enrichment, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, Alien Torts Claims Act, Illinois State Claim, 
Louisiana State Claim, New Jersey State Claim, New York State Claim, and Texas State 
Claim. Id. at 93-115. 
81 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 
2004). The damages which would be awarded under the ATCA claim (which was pied in 
the alternative) and the consumer fraud statutory claims were not specified. 
82 First Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 8. 
83 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (1995). 
84 Id. ; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2004). 
85 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1109-10. 
86 See Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, The Development of the Movement for Reparations for African 
Descendants, 3 J.L. Soc'y 133, 140 (2002) (commenting neutrally on Cato); Alfred L. 
Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 497, 512 (2003) (commenting neutrally on Cato); Chad W. Bryan, Precedent 
for Reparations? A Look at Historical Movements for Redress and Where Awarding 
Reparations/or Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REv. 599,604 (2003) (commenting neutrally 
on Cato); Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery As A Takings Clause Violation , 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 191 , 248 (2003). 
87 This point iG separate from whether descendents of legal wrongdoers should feel a 
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Therefore, the only way to raise claims for personal injuries directly would be 
to identify a defendant that still exists to be sued, which would naturally entail 
identifying a corporate defendant, which could then be held responsible either 
derivatively under the doctrine of respondeat superior or directly under the 
theory that its agents engaged in wrongdoing under the direction of the firm's 
management. 88 Second, to the extent that the descendents of individual 
slaveholders, slave traders, and other officials who operated the machinery of 
slavery hold property that belonged to slaves or hold wealth created by slaves, 
they are likely to be immune from suit under the good faith purchaser 
doctrine. 89 An heir is not a purchaser but someone who received money and 
relied (presumably) in good faith that the transfer was valid by making 
expenditures and, in the case of slavery, passing the property on to another 
generation of heirs, who also acted in good faith. 90 As a theoretical matter, the 
plaintiffs might have been able to make a claim for restitution of wealth 
inherited by the heirs of wrongdoers from the nineteenth century. As a 
practical matter, any suit would require tracing the movement of chattel and 
money over many generations and an uphill battle to overcome the balance of 
equities which would, as an initial matter, favor the defendants. 91 
moral or political responsibility for the actions of their forbears. See Mari J. Matsuda, 
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 
323 ( 1987); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical 
lnjusitces, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003); George Schedler, Responsibility for and 
Estimation of the Damages of American Slavery, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 307 (2003); Jeremy 
Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992); Kaimipono David Wenger, 
Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations Debate (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author). 
88 See Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social Responsibility and African American 
Reparations: Jubilee, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 309, 358-61 (2003). 
89 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 53, at§ 26. 
90 See Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law 
Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 , 127 (2004) (explaining that the descendants of 
slaves may be able to make an unjust enrichment claim against the heirs of the 
slaveowners); Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification, 
Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1139, 1156-57 (2004) 
[hereinafter Dagan, Restitution and Slavery] (arguing that targeting recipients of goods who 
acted in bad faith is one way restitution law attempts to solve the problem of 
intergenerational justice). 
91 It should be noted that heirs of slave wealth might not be as obviously innocent as the 
bona fide purchaser defense requires. It is an open question how much each subsequent 
generation after emancipation knew about the origins of family property as it descended. 
Furthermore, as Alfred Brophy noted, claims for restitution of chattel or real property may 
strike courts as less susceptible to the bona fide purchaser defense than restitution of profit. 
See Brophy, supra note 90, at 127 (discussing Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d. 
954 (9th Cir. 2000), in which the niece (and heir) of the owner of a painting that had been 
given to the Austrian Gallery under duress sued for its return). The Altmann case is not a 
very convincing example, as the defendant cannot honestly be described as an innocent 
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Other practical considerations made claims for restitution from corporate 
defendants the most sensible course of action. Although the plaintiffs alleged 
in their complaint actions by the defendants that sounded in personal injury, 
their argument for why their claim was not time-barred by applicable statute of 
limitations depends in crucial ways on the wrong arising from a failure on the 
part of the defendants to disgorge their wrongful gains.92 Judge Norgle noted 
that, in answer to the inevitable question of why suits arising from events 
ending in the nineteenth century were not barred by statute of limitations for 
common law and statutory claims that ranged from one to six years, the 
plaintiffs invoked the discovery rule, the continuing violation doctrine, 
equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling.93 While Judge Norgle was 
unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' arguments, they reveal why, relatively speaking, 
their claims for restitution against existing corporations would be more likely 
to survive a statute of limitations attack than a suit for personal injury against 
an individual or corporation or a suit for restitution against a corporation. The 
plaintiffs used the complex and continuing existence of the corporate 
defendants as an additional factor designed to move judicial discretion in their 
favor. 94 In the complaint, the plaintiffs emphasized that the original plaintiffs, 
the slaves themselves, could not know about the "investments, insurance 
policies, joint ventures[,] and other schemes developed by [the] defendants ... 
to profit from slavery."95 This is in contrast, presumably, to the kidnapping, 
beatings, murder, and rape the slaves knew about and over which they could 
purchaser. See Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust Victim 
Fine Arts Litigation and a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50 CASE W. RES. L. 
REv. 87, 96-98 (1999) (describing recent claims regarding art stolen during World War II). 
But see Elizabeth Tyler Bates, Contemplating Lawsuits for the Recovery of Slave Property: 
The Case of Slave Art, 55 ALA. L. REV. I l09, I 121 (2004) (describing the "underlying 
principle of property law that a thief cannot pass good title in the stolen property, even to an 
innocent good-faith purchaser"). The discussion of the status of innocent purchasers of 
stolen property underscores the importance of keeping straight the various categories of 
restitution at issue. Of crucial importance to the bona fide purchaser defense of the heirs of 
wealth created by slavery is that the slaves had no title to the property that the slaveholders 
wrongfully obtained by means of the slave labor. I discuss this point in Anthony J. Sebok, 
Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between 
the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 651,655 (2003) (explaining that plaintiffs who can 
only claim title through equity are on the same footing as the heirs of the bona fide 
purchasers). 
92 First Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 85-91 . 
93 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1070, l074 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (explaining that plaintiffs invoked the discovery rule). I am not including in this 
discussion the plaintiffs arguments concerning the statute of limitations for crimes against 
humanity, which they maintain have no statute of limitations. 
94 Id. at l039-41 (outlining plaintiffs allegations against corporate defendants). 
95 Id. at 1070 (quoting plaintiffs response to defendant's motion to dismiss). 
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have sued after emancipation (albeit without any credible hope of success).96 
Furthermore, while not argued explicitly, there is an expectation that 
corporations are more capable of maintaining and handling information than 
individuals. A court that might have taken the view that the absence of 
information that could have led to a restitution claim within the applicable 
statute of limitations was no one's fault in the case of a claim between the 
descendents of a slave and a slaveholder, they might take a less charitable view 
in a case involving a corporate defendant. Firms and other corporate entities, 
such as universities, could be seen as willfully blind if they made no inquiry 
into the source of their assets, thus strengthening the claim that the failure to 
engage in an accounting of assets is a continuing violation or worse, grounds 
for the plaintiff to claim equitable estoppel. 
For reasons relating to the selection of defendant and the desire to avoid 
various affirmative defenses, the slavery suit that was filed was basically a 
restitution suit. As the media noted, the suit clearly arose from one of the most 
widespread and injurious assault on human rights in history. Yet, as with the 
Holocaust and tobacco suits, the logic of mass restitution forced the plaintiffs 
to depict slavery not as a personal or dignitary injury, but as a dispute over 
wrongfully held property. Farmer-Paellmann has conceded that tactical and 
legal concerns led the lawyers to focus their claims on only a subset of 
wrongdoers (corporations) and a subset of private law remedies (unjust 
enrichment): "We focused on the path ofleast resistance, the corporations .... 
The theory, basically, is that the corporations are in possession of our 
inheritance. "97 
II. THE RISKS OF MASS RESTITUTION 
Is there any reason to regret the strategic choice to reframe a claim about the 
crime of slavery as a claim about the wrongful gains of corporations? There 
are two ways to think about this question. The first is to accept the premise of 
96 The plaintiffs argued that the limitations period should be equitably tolled not only 
because of lack of information, but because of the lack of equal access to the justice system. 
Id. at 1074. Judge Norgle did not accept this argument: 
It is true that because of the institution of slavery, the Jim Crow laws, and the lingering 
bigotries and separatist views following the Civil War, African-Americans were 
obstructed from obtaining necessary information on their claims and in some instances 
access to the legal system. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' ancestors knew of their injury at 
the time that it occurred. They knew, or should have known that they were wrongfully 
being forced to work without compensation, and that somebody was making a profit 
from their labor. Yet, neither Plaintiffs nor their ancestors ever asserted these claims in 
a court of law until now. Plaintiffs have not shown that they acted with all due 
diligence in attempting to obtain vital information about their claims, and assert them 
timely. 
Id. at 1074. 
97 Zanto Peabody, Forum Addresses Slave Reparations: Speakers Urge Black 
Descendants to Join Fight for Financial Redress, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 17, 2002, at A42. 
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the question (that the pursuit of restitution is a second-best solution to alternate 
legal claims) but to weigh the costs and benefits of using a legal fiction such as 
restitution. The second is to reject the premise and argue that there is nothing 
second-best about the restitution claims - that the disgorgement of wrongfully 
gained corporate profits should be one of(although not the only) core purposes 
of a legal response to massive historical wrongdoing. I shall look at each 
argument in tum. 
A. Commodification 
The basic argument against using restitution as a tactic is that it obscures the 
real wrong that originally motivated the change in social attitudes that made 
the litigation possible. This might seem like a highly formalistic concern. 
After all, the lawyers and activists who bring mass restitution suits are 
probably more aware than most that too little attention had been paid to the 
underlying wrongs relating to the relationship between German and Swiss 
corporate elites and the Nazi government, or the enduring power of the tobacco 
industry over both American government and media, or the failure of 
American society to take steps to rectify the consequences of centuries of 
slavery. Yet the temptation to do something might obscure the cost of doing 
anything instead of doing nothing.98 Is there a cost? 
It is hard to approach the question empirically. Before the Holocaust suits 
were brought, the public had paid little attention to the conduct of Swiss banks 
or the role of slave labor in German industry during World War II. 
Undoubtedly, more attention is being paid now, and one should think that this 
is a good thing. The same can be said for the state reimbursement suits against 
the tobacco industry. Before the states began their litigation, public attitudes 
about the industry, while increasingly hostile, had not yet completely turned. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the most important consequence of the state's 
litigation has been on the political environment, which has turned decidedly 
negative towards the tobacco industry.99 One might argue that individual 
smokers' cases have also been affected, and that the relatively higher rate of 
plaintiff victories (as well as spectacular punitive damages) is a direct result of 
the litigation. 100 
98 
"The risk of litigation is not simply acting in default, it is defaulting too much in 
action." Lafrance, supra note 37, at 202 (discussing the failure of the tobacco litigation). 
99 See A Brief History, supra note 7; Anthony J. Sebok, Pretext, Transparency and 
Motive in Mass Restitution Litigation, 57 V AND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
100 Since the Master Settlement Agreement, the tobacco industry's record has still been 
impressive, but it is now losing a greater proportion of cases than in the period described in 
the text accompanying note 37, supra. See Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation 
as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 230-31 (2002) (of 
post-MSA trials examined, the tobacco industry won 12 cases and lost six). See, e.g., 
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1254 (D. Kan. 2002) (jury 
returned a verdict granting Burton a $196,416 compensatory award and authorizing punitive 
damages; the court later added a $15 million punitive award); Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
1424 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1405 
Against the general and untestable assertion that mass restitution litigation 
has changed social attitudes and enabled further and salutary legal and political 
progress, there is some evidence that the restitution strategy in the Holocaust 
litigation and tobacco reimbursement suits failed to provide a clear normative 
judgment about the wrongfulness of the defendants' underlying conduct. One 
ironic result of the MSA, for example, is that the same states that sued the 
tobacco industry on the grounds that it had profited from the promotion of a 
product that caused sickness and death are now dependent on the sale of that 
product to maintain their state budgets. 101 Observers critical of the MSA have 
argued that it has blunted or halted momentum towards a larger discussion of 
national or state-wide smoking policy. 102 Arthur Lafrance argued that this was 
because the consequences of litigation, if truly carried out, would have been 
too calamitous for American society to accept, so the states allowed a process 
to go forward that neither forced the industry to address its tortious conduct nor 
achieved the sort of public health policy that legislative debate and 
compromise might have produced. 103 
122 Cal. App. 4th 684, 692-93 (2004) (jury awarded $5,539,127 in compensatory and $3 
billion in punitive damages; punitive damages reduced to $50 million on appeal); Henley v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1429, 1437, 1475 (2004) (jury awarded $1.5 million in 
compensatory and $50 million in punitive damages; punitive damages reduced to $9 million 
on appeal); Frankson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 781 N.Y.S.2d 427,427 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2004) (jury originally awarded $350,000 in compensatory and $20 million in 
punitive damages); Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) 
(jury awarded $821,485.80 in compensatory, later reduced by the court to $521,485.80, and 
$79.5 million in punitive damages). Because of the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (establishing a 
framework for determining whether punitive damage awards are excessive and therefore 
violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), virtually all of the punitive 
damages awards in these cases either have or will be appealed, and have or probably will be 
reduced. 
101 For example, in two recent cases where it appeared that the industry might face 
bankrupting court proceedings brought by private litigants, the states came to the aid of the 
tobacco industry, and helped the industry blunt legal maneuvers by private plaintiffs to 
fatally wound the industry. See John Kennedy, Tobacco Verdicts Light Up Fears: 
Lawmakers Are Afraid Settlement Money Might Disappear, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., April 
11, 2000, at Dl (Florida legislature plans to cap appeals bonds retroactively to protect 
tobacco industry in Engle suit); States Try to Save Cigarette Maker and Their Own Coffers: 
Philip Morris Threatens Bankruptcy: One Suit too Many?, DETROIT NEWS, April 12, 2003, 
at D6 (a majority of the nation's state attorneys general filed a brief in an Illinois consumer 
class action seeking to protect Philip Morris from paying the full amount of a $12 billion 
appeal bond). Most states seem to have diverted much of their MSA payments towards 
general funds. See, e.g., Kevin Corcoran, Efforts to Reduce Smoking Take a Hit: Budget 
Diverts Tobacco Funds to Other Programs, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 13, 2003, at lB. 
102 Lafrance, supra note 37, at 189 (arguing that the MSA has not adequately addressed 
the wrongs committed by the tobacco industry). 
103 
"What is different about tobacco litigation, however, is that the potential claimants are 
so numerous, the scope of the offending conduct so vast and the resources of the defendants 
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Libby Adler and Peer Zumbansen have argued that the Swiss bank and 
German slave labor litigation was not a success because it failed to produce a 
clear normative judgment about the conduct of the defendants. 104 The 
corporations were permitted to represent to the world that they had accepted 
"moral" but not legal responsibility for their actions by settling the cases. 105 
According to Adler and Zumbansen, this was a sham: the settlement had no 
actual moral force because all the participants in its negotiation, such as the 
United State's representative, Stuart Eizenstat, treated the legal claims as if 
they were mere pretense. 106 By successfully persuading the public that the 
legal claims had little merit, the defendants also avoided a serious debate over 
their moral responsibility.107 Adler and Zumbansen observed that the 
settlement left many of the plaintiffs in the class action feeling unsatisfied, 
since no credible correspondence existed between the remedy the lawsuits 
demanded and the settlement actually secured. 108 
Adler and Zumbansen argued that the slave labor claims, when asserted, 
were open to two interpretations: as restitution for unpaid labor or as 
so huge, that conventional litigation is simply inadequate to capture and contain the issues 
or assure appropriate relief. It thus fails both as a policy and a compensatory vehicle." Id. 
104 Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the 
German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich, 39 
HARV. J. ON L EGIS. 1, 3 (2002). 
105 Id. at 54 (concluding that the companies' statements that they owed a moral , though 
not legal duty, are untenable). 
106 Id. at 28-30. 
107 Adler and Zumbausen describe this tactic: 
The strategy of separating moral or political responsibility from legal responsibility 
has served the companies well. Today's enlightened German industrialists have earned 
endless congratulations for courageously coming to terms with injuries largely ignored 
for 55 years while at the same time leaving themselves room to deny the validity of the 
legal claims. A close examination of the legal issues reveals, however, that the 
separation is a false one, and that some of the most difficult moral questions associated 
with the Holocaust - questions about agency and about why it happened - underlie the 
particular legal issues raised . . . . 
Ultimately, therefore, the refrain offered by the companies that they owe a moral 
responsibility but not a legal one is untenable. Each of the defenses that the companies 
proffered implies not just a disclaimer of legal liability, but also a larger denial of 
remorse. 
Id. at 53-54 (internal citations omitted). 
108 This dissatisfaction is illustrated by two plaintiff's experiences: 
On June 28, the day she received at most $2,200, Alicja Chy! of Poland told the 
Associated Press, "It's a piteous amount of money . . . . It' s nothing for my work." 
Aron Krell , a Polish-born survivor living in New York, lamented, "To me this is partial 
back pay - very little, very late ... Even if you said we were owed the minimum wage 
that was prevalent then in Germany, with a tiny rate of interest the amounts would have 
to be much, much larger than what we' re getting." 
Id. at 29 (citations omitted). 
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reparations for an injury rooted in racist ideology. 109 The defendants seized 
upon the settlement to suppress the latter interpretation and promoted the 
former because it carried with it little or no moral consequences. 110 I agree 
with this characterization of what happened, and its aftermath. What Adler 
and Zumbansen did not consider, however, is the degree to which the 
plaintiffs' own tactical choices produced the opportunity seized by the 
defendants. Adler and Zumbansen argued that a reparative interpretation could 
have been imposed on the mass restitution suits that had been filed. 111 Their 
view is consistent with Hanoch Dagan's paper in this volume. 112 As a 
historical matter, they agree that something was lost in the course of the 
Holocaust litigation. Whether reparative meaning can be preserved in suits for 
restitution is something that will have to be set aside until the next section. 
Why might reframing tort-like claims relating to personal and dignitary 
injuries into a claim about unpaid labor fail to capture the wrongful conduct 
that originally motivated mass restitution claims? By grounding their claims in 
unjust enrichment, the plaintiffs are emphasizing the defendants' wrongful 
retention of some thing (wealth) that legally belongs to the plaintiffs and not 
the defendants. This is merely an elaboration of the fact that wealth held by 
the corporations is the present-day value of the labor that was wrongfully 
obtained by those same defendants during slavery. It is true that one way of 
describing slavery is that it is forced labor without pay. But that's an 
impoverished understanding of slavery, which involves a complex series of 
harms, and which is not necessarily primarily about the failure to compensate 
another for labor.113 To focus on the value of the labor "commodities" the 
wrongs of slavery by equating one type of remedy (disgorgement) with the 
wrong (unjust enrichment). 
109 Id. at 53. 
[T]he Nazi labor program can be viewed as either war-related or as a matter of racial 
ideology .... War as well as racist ideological motives propelled the program and gave 
rise to plaintiffs' injuries, so neither the legal conclusion that plaintiffs were seeking 
reparations nor the contrary conclusion that they were seeking compensation for a 
private wrong was required. 
Id. at 48 . 
110 Id. at 53. 
111 Id. at 49. 
112 See Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1140-41 (establishing a 
framework for evaluating mass restitution suits). 
113 There are multiple definitions of slavery designed for multiple purposes (the 
enforcement of international law, the Thirteenth Amendment, or historical research). The 
purpose of this article is to analyze the conceptual structure of private law and its function in 
American society. For this purpose, the following definition seems to capture a broad sense 
of the term slavery: "A power relation of domination, degradation, and subservience, in 
which human beings are treated as chattel, not persons." Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel 
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1365 (1992). 
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The minimum requirements for a claim of unjust enrichment based on 
quantum meruit are: 
(1) [A] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the 
acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without payment of its value. 114 
The slavery class action requires its plaintiffs to argue that the legal claim 
that have been preserved and carried forward for generations of African 
Americans is not that their ancestors were kidnapped from their homes, their 
political freedoms denied, and their culture obliterated, but that they were not 
paid for the work they did under those conditions. The problem with this claim 
is not that it is legally invalid - the factual conditions for a quantum mentit 
claim are satisfied by slavery. 115 The problem is that a claim for restitution as 
a result of work done during enslavement seems to treat the other wrongful 
aspects of slavery as nothing more that events of wealth-production. By 
making restitution the only remedy ( assuming the tort and human rights actions 
are dismissed), the litigants have limited their complaint about the grotesque 
wrongs of slavery to complaints that the grotesque wrongs produced wealth to 
which they were entitled. This is what I mean by commodification. 
B. Legal Fictions 
One response to this concern is to note that the law makes productive use of 
"legal fictions" all the time. 116 Lon Fuller defended legal fictions on the 
ground that they are sometimes necessary to allow an unfamiliar or emerging 
legal concept to take root in a legal system. 117 A legal fiction could provide a 
114 Haz-Mat Response v. Certified Waste Servs., 910 P.2d 839, 847 (Kan. 1996). To 
define the grounds for restitution based on a claim for quantum meruit in terms of unpaid 
labor is not to say that it is not a form of rights vindication, however. That is, if the 
withholding of the wealth produced by the plaintiffs labor is wrong, then the plaintiff has a 
prima facie right to the wealth. On this point I agree with Dagan. See Dagan, Restitution 
and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1148-49 (quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages 
as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 4-5, 11 (1999)). 
115 Similarly, there is no doubt that the claims for the money, property, and wealth gained 
from slavery were properly the subject of restitution claims based on claims for replevin, 
money had and received and quantum meruit in the Swiss Bank cases and the Holocaust 
slave labor cases. As Irwin Cotler put it, "we are talking about thefticide - the greatest mass 
theft on the occasion of the greatest mass murder in history." Irwin Cotler, The Holocaust, 
Thefticide and Restitution: A Legal Perspective, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 601, 602 (1998). The 
question this article raises is not whether theft occurred, but whether "thefticide" is a 
category that should stand in the same normative and political space as genocide. See Id. 
11 6 See Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041 , 1118 n.281 
(1999). 
117 LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 70 (1967). 
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rationale or justification for a line of cases that fits the precedents, but which 
would not necessarily persist as a principle. 118 Fuller quoted from John 
Chipman Gray, who said that "[s]uch fictions are scaffolding - useful, almost 
necessary, in construction - but, after a building is erected, serving only to 
obscure it."119 Applying this viewpoint to the mass restitution cases, it 
suggests that my formalist concerns can be set aside as long as the fictions 
employed are designed ( or have the potential) to allow a new and less 
provisional set of legal concepts to take hold. 
Fuller took the position that fictions which identified themselves as such 
were usually harmless and often helpful - doctrines that claimed for 
themselves "nonfictitious" status "often ha[ve] a spurious self-evidence about 
[them]." 120 However it is not clear whether the decision to sue for restitution is 
a legal fiction as opposed to an exercise of discretion to choose one legal 
avenue instead of another (albeit for understandable tactical reasons). As 
mentioned above, unjust enrichment claims compose part of the prima facie 
claims that a proper plaintiff could demand from defendants who played a role 
American slavery. They are not fictional, just as the genuine prima facie 
restitution suits arising from Holocaust and the tobacco litigation are not 
fictional. The issue of legal fiction in these cases is not so much about the 
adoption of a rationale for the doctrine the plaintiffs' hope to use - quantum 
meruit - but about the rationale for choosing that species of private law claim 
as opposed to one sounding in tort or constitutional law. 
In any event, according to Fuller, a legal fiction "that is plainly fictitious 
must seek its justification in considerations of social and economic policy."121 
What negative consequences might flow from the "commodification" of the 
plaintiffs' claims in the slavery suits, even if the claims are properly called 
legal fictions? 
In her book Contested Commodities, the legal scholar Margaret Radin noted 
that there is a real risk in adopting the rhetoric of property when discussing 
serious issues involving bodily integrity. 122 Her argument was based on the 
problem of how to properly describe the wrong of rape. 123 Radin was 
disturbed by the growing popularity among private law scholars of defining 
118 For example, the original justification for the "attractive nuisance" doctrine may no 
longer be plausible, but it served to help establish the exception to landowner liability rules 
that were otherwise too pro-defendant. Id. at 71. 
119 Id. at 70 (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 35 (2d ed. 
1921)). 
120 Id. at 71. 
121 Id. 
122 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 87 (1996) [hereinafter 
CONTESTED COMMODITIES] (noting problems with using the rhetoric of property when 
discussing matters of bodily integrity). 
123 Id. at 86 (questioning Posner's use of market theory to discuss rape). 
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rape as a decision to "bypass" the market. 124 Radin' s concern went beyond 
worrying that such arguments might be mishandled, resulting in an 
undervaluing of the "costs" of rape. 125 Her larger concern related to the 
rhetoric itself. The phrase "market bypass" implied that there is a proper 
market for the attribute sought by the wrongdoer (in this case, a rapist). 126 
Radin argued that to most people, this presumption "seems intuitively out of 
place ... so inappropriate that it is either silly, or somehow insulting to the 
value being discussed, or both."127 
Radin explained her intuition by drawing a distinction between bodily 
integrity, which is an "attribute" of personhood, and the things over which a 
person has control, which can properly be called objects or things (even if they 
are intangible, such as the product of human imagination). Radin's objection 
to some scholars' use of market language in the context of rape is instructive. 
Her complaint went beyond the mere instrumental. A market language 
approach to rape might be quite well-intentioned, but no matter how hard its 
advocates hope it would produce a world in which women were better off, it 
would fail for a fundamental reason.128 There is, Radin argued, a cost to 
detaching an attribute of personhood from a person: 
Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is 
threatening to personhood because it detaches from the person that which 
is integral to the person. Such a conception makes actual loss of the 
attribute easier to countenance .. . . [I]f my bodily integrity is an integral 
personal attribute, not a detachable object, then hypothetically valuing my 
bodily integrity in terms of money is not far removed from valuing me in 
terms of money. 129 
Radin suggested that while many scholars believe they are wielding 
conceptual tools, exactly as they want to when they "borrow" the language of 
the market - often to appear hard-nosed - they risk becoming unwilling allies 
to the idea that everything can be reduced to forms of money and property.130 
124 Id. at 86-87 (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 218 (4th ed. 
1992) (concluding that rapists bypass the normal sexual relations market); Guido Calabresi 
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1124-27 (1972) (arguing that people should hold an 
entitlement, akin to property laws, for their personal bodily integrity)). 
125 Id. at 87 (explaining that some users of a cost-benefit analysis may not place 
sufficient value on the costs of rape). 
126 Keith Hylton adopts the phrase "market bypassing" from Posner in his discussion of 
the tort of slavery. See Hylton, supra note 71 , at 1244. 
127 CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 87. 
12s Id. 
129 Id. at 88. 
130 Id. at 92 (reflecting on whether to view rape, in a cost-benefit scheme, as an act that 
benefits the rapist); see Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth 
Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REv. 687, 717 (1999) ("The most prominent proponent of what 
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She called this a "domino theory," in which, despite the best intentions of all 
involved, market language crowds out non-market language. 131 The ultimate 
cost of using market language is not necessarily that the specific goal which 
led to the tactical adoption of the commodified language is stymied, but rather 
that there are less obvious spill-over "social" effects, such as the infiltration of 
market language into contexts where non-market values and reasons should 
dominate. 132 
Radin was skeptical of the domino theory, but not necessarily as a 
descriptive matter. 133 Yet she felt that there were good reasons why people 
should resist the spread of market rhetoric, and noted that, unless carefully 
handled, language that commodities attributes of personality can often lead 
lawyers and legal language astray. 134 She preferred a conception of property 
that allowed for "incomplete commodification." An interaction can reflect 
incomplete commodification to the extent that it allows market and non-market 
interpretations simultaneously. 135 The example she used to illustrate this 
concept was work. Radin noted that aspects of work could be commodified 
while others could not. 136 The details of which aspects of work as a contested 
concept fall on which side of the divide is less important for my discussion of 
slavery than noting that, for Radin, the key to avoiding the caricatured legal 
rhetoric of commodification depended on keeping straight which legal 
categories could be appropriately treated by market language (and concepts) 
and which could not. 137 
is here called 'romanticism' - the fear that market transactions will result in an alienating 
universal commodification of subjects as well as objects - is Margaret Jane Radin."). 
131 CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 99-100 (explaining that there is a 
slippery slope, wherein market regime language beings to include everything that has 
value). 
132 
"Margaret Radin has presented a powerful argument that [market] rhetoric can and 
does, over time, influence the way we conceptualize the world, and ultimately act in the 
world." Stephen D. Osborne, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 203,235 n.211 (2003). 
133 CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 103 (arguing that the domino theory is 
not absolute, in that when both market and nonmarket understandings exist, the market 
theory will not necessarily win out); see Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: 
On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 75, 91 n.62 (2004) (agreeing with Radin 
that the domino theory is not absolute in its prediction that some commodification will lead 
to absolute commodification). 
134 
"This kind of resistance to the domino theory would see a nonmarket aspect to much 
of the market." CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 101. 
135 Id. at 102-03 (explaining that market and nonmarket understandings can exist and 
overlap if the individual understandings of each are not crystallized). 
136 Id. at 105 (explaining that the concept of work contains both commodified and 
noncommodified elements). 
137 
"Complete commodification of work - pure labor - does violence to our notion of 
what it is to be a well-developed person." Id. at 107. 
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A claim for unjust enrichment from slavery measures the wrongful taking 
from the slave entirely by the slave's labor-value, and so suggests a rhetoric of 
complete commodification. The risk, therefore, in responding to slavery 
through the lens of unjust enrichment is that it fails to offer a legal 
characterization of the wrong that occurs when the non-commodifiable aspect 
of labor is violated. 138 
III. THE HARM OF "Loss OF CONTROL" AND COMMODIFICATION 
Another argument that can be made in response to the commodification 
problem is that claims for restitution of labor are not legal fictions at all - they 
do exactly what they ought to do, which is to allow people to "vindicate" their 
rights to autonomy through money damages. Hanoch Dagan makes this 
argument forcefully in his forthcoming book, The Law and Ethics of 
Restitution, and also in an article in this symposium. 139 
Dagan's argument is complex, and I will simplify it here. He argues that the 
right to a resource is a complex and contested concept. 140 In this sense, he 
agrees with Radin, who also described property as a contested concept. 141 For 
Dagan, the question of restitution is not so much about the right to property but 
the entitlements one has in various resources. Those rights are determined by 
the variety of values society wishes to recognize in an entitlement. 142 They 
include the "cherished libertarian value of control, [the] utilitarian value of 
well-being, [and the] value of sharing ... [which] calls for other-regarding 
actions and seeks to inculcate other-regarding motives."143 These values, 
become the entitlements for which a property-holder can demand restitution if 
they are infringed. 144 
The two values that are of the most importance for claims of restitution 
arising from slavery are the values of control and well-being. In his earlier 
work, Dagan had analogized control to the entitlement protected by a 
138 A tort action for battery or false imprisonment would not really do this either, which 
is why Hylton suggests a new hybrid tort, which he calls the "social torts" of slavery. See 
Hylton, supra note 71, at 1224-29. This article does not necessarily reject this proposal. It 
only argues that unjust enrichment cannot capture the "incompletely commodified" nature 
of free labor. 
139 DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on 
file with the author) [hereinafter DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION]; Dagan, 
Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1148. 
140 DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 239). 
141 CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 104 (explaining that there are situations 
of contested commodification that should be compared to how powerful the market 
conceptualization is). 
142 DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 230-31 ). 
143 Id. 
144 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1148-49 (arguing that the wrongs 
committed are not wrongs against property rights, but against basic human rights). 
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Calabresi-Melamed property rule and well-being to the entitlement protected 
by a Calabresi-Melamed liability rule.145 The former protects the right-
holder's power of consent over the resource, and the latter protects the right-
holder's interest in an objective level of utility in the resource. 146 The different 
entitlements are protected by different measures of recovery: consent by the 
"profits measure" and well-being by the measure of the resource's "fair-market 
value." According to Dagan, each measure of recovery is a form of 
rectification and thus fits within the corrective justice model of private law: 
"The profits measure reflects and reverses a breach of the plaintiffs 
entitlement to control the resource, while the fair-market value reflects and 
reverses a breach of her entitlement to the well-being embodied by the 
resource."147 
According to Dagan, the commodification problem dissolves because not all 
restitutionary remedies rectify a resource-holder's loss of economic value. A 
restitutionary remedy for the loss of control has a social meaning different 
from a restitutionary remedy for loss of well-being. 148 When a restituitonary 
remedy of profits is awarded, it vindicates a resource-holder's autonomy. 
Dagan takes from this that, in unjust enrichment, restitution for profits in 
excess of the fair market value of the thing taken is conditioned on the loss of 
plaintiffs control over her labor, not over the labor itself. 149 Thus, when the 
plaintiffs in a mass restitution suit sue in restitution for the profits of slavery, 
they are not only not engaged in a legal fiction, they are explicitly using the 
law to recover the loss of an interest that is central to what makes slavery 
uniquely wrong - the loss of control or autonomy. 
This is a very promising argument, but is based on a confusion of what kind 
of injustice is rectified by unjust enrichment law. Dagan's definition of 
restitution is broader than others', but it still remains fundamentally tethered to 
the concept of a remedy for the infringement of a right to a resource. 150 It is 
not, for example, meant to compensate people for wrongful losses (that is the 
145 HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC 
VALUES 14 (1997) [hereinafter DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT] (citing Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1090, 1092, I 105-06 (1972)). 
146 DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 145, at 15. 
147 DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 242). 
Dagan thus argues that his approach fits within the spirit, if not the Jetter, of the argument 
set out by Weinrib in Restitutionary Damages, supra note 69. 
148 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1147-49 (explaining that 
restitutionary claims may be undesirable in that they deny the absolute right of people to 
control their own labor). 
149 Id. (discussing the plaintiffs' loss of control over their own labor). 
150 See DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 145, at 4-5 n.15 (distinguishing the 
approach adopted in UNJUST ENRICHMENT from the "narrow property-based approach" of 
Samuel J. Stoljar and Daniel Friedmann). 
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job of tort law), although sometimes tort remedies and restitution overlap. 151 
The vindication of the right to control is not compensatory in the sense that the 
plaintiff is compensated for pain, suffering or emotional distress, or even a 
wrongful loss analogous to the dignitary harms compensated through tort 
claims for false imprisonment or the violation of the right to privacy. If it 
were, suits based on loss of control of a resource would really be tort suits, and 
their presentation as suits in restitution would be nothing more than "clever 
plead[ing]" made necessary by "technical distinctions [that] may arise in states 
that take the pleading fictions seriously."152 
Dagan's answer to this objection is that restitutionary damages that exceed 
the fair market value of the resource taken by the infringer are, strictly 
speaking, neither compensation nor property. What are they, exactly? In the 
famous case of O/well v. Nye and Nissen Co., the defendant secretly used an 
egg-washing machine owned by the plaintiff. 153 The defendant profited from 
the deceit because labor was expensive and the machine, left unused by the 
plaintiff, was a great help to the defendant. Rather than award the rental value 
of the machine (fair market value), the court forced the defendant to give back 
all the money he had saved (his profits). Dagan says that disgorgement of the 
profits served to "vindicate[] the plaintiffs role as the ultimate decisionmaker 
with respect to the use of such resource."154 
In earlier writings, Dagan defined "vindication" as: ( 1) the remedy of a 
"mischief - such as the diminution of one's well-being, or any disrespect to 
one's control;" and (2) an ex ante incentive to deter wrongdoing. 155 The latter 
meaning of the term is a familiar instrumentalist explanation of why profits 
should be taken from conscious-wrongdoers in restitution - to deter market 
151 Most of the cases that would entail a measure of recovery for loss of control would 
fall under the category of waiver of tort. See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 
652, 654 (Wash. 1946) (holding that because plaintiff elected "to waive his right of action in 
tort and to sue in assumpsit on the implied contract," he is entitled to the restitutionary 
measure of recovery (emphasis in original)). Laycock has argued that in such cases, while 
the remedy is restitutionary, the substantive basis for the recovery is another department of 
private law such as tort or contract. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of 
Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1286 (1989). Dagan, who clearly is concerned with the 
substantive basis of restitution, thinks otherwise, and considers the grounds for recovery 
independent of tort or contract law in cases such as Otwell. See DAGAN, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT, supra note 145, at 5-6. 
152 Laycock, supra note 151, at 1286. 
153 0/well, 173 P.2d at 652-53. 
154 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at I 150. 
155 DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 145, at 9 n.28. Klimchuk takes a similar 
position. Dennis Klimchuk, Unjust Enrichment and Reparations for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. 
REv. 1257, 1275 (2004) ("The refusal to make restitution to slaves for unpaid wages 
amounts to the claim that the value of their labour is retained by slaveholders on an adequate 
legal basis."). 
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bypass.156 Dagan offers an interpretation of the instrumentalist account that 
takes it outside of the welfare-maximizing rationale criticized by Radin in her 
discussion of the law-and-economics rationale for penalties for rape. 157 He 
observes that by disgorging the wrongdoer's profits, society expresses its 
disapproval of the infringement. 158 Thus, not only does profit as a measure of 
recovery promote social ends unrelated to the interests of the plaintiff, but it 
actually conveys to the plaintiff an important message. It tells the plaintiff that 
the infringement she suffered related not only to the market-value of the 
resource at issue, but also that it takes the moral dimension of the loss of 
control seriously. 159 
Dagan's interpretation of the "noninstrumentalist" reason for disgorging 
profits in cases like 0/well is attractive, but it cannot explain why giving the 
profits gained by the infringer to the plaintiff further promotes the end of 
communicating the social meaning of the restitution suit. The problem he 
faces is similar to that faced by Jean Hampton in her defense of retribution. 160 
Hampton argued that retribution could be a form of corrective justice because 
it forced wrongdoers to repair their victims' "moral injury," not just their 
economic, physical, and hedonic injuries. 161 Moral injury is not a physical 
harm, nor the psychological pain that one might experience after being the 
object of a moral injury.162 It harms the victim's value in that while the 
wrongdoer denies the victim's true value, her value is not being fully realized. 
The diminution of the realization of the victim's value can have other harmful 
consequences, but the original failure of realization is itself a wrong. Left 
uncorrected, a denial of the true value of one person (and the wrongful 
elevation of the value of another) may be a continuing harm because the 
persistence of the false statement of value may be a reason others come to 
156 See, e.g., James J. Edelman, Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 TEX. L. 
REv. 1869, 1876 (2001) (discussing the deterrence rationale of Olwell); DAGAN, LAW AND 
ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 236). 
1
~
7 See discussion supra notes 122-138 and accompanying text. 
158 DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 243-44). 
159 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1151-52. 
160 See JEAN HAMPTON & JEFFRIE MURPHY' FORGIVENESS AND MERCY ( 1992) [hereinafter 
FORGIVENESS]; Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659 (1992) [hereinafter Correcting Harms]. 
16 1 Hampton's concept of moral injury is very similar to Dagan's concept of vindication 
for loss of control: 
A person behaves wrongfully in a way that effects a moral injury to another when she 
treats that person in a way that is precluded by that person's value, and/or by 
representing him as worth far less than his actual value; or, in other words, when the 
meaning of her action is such that she diminishes him, and by doing so, represents 
herself as elevated with respect to him, thereby according herself a value that she does 
not have. 
Correcting Harms, supra note 160, at 1677 (emphasis in original). 
162 Id. at 1666. 
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express towards the victim the false view that his value is less than equal. 163 In 
fact, the "decision not to [ correct the false expression of value is itself] 
expressive: it communicates to the victim and to the wider society the idea that 
such treatment, and the status it attributes the victim, are appropriate."164 
As in Dagan' s account of vindication of control, there may be a temptation 
to convert this argument into some form of consequentialism: The reason we 
punish moral injury is to deter it, and the reason we want less moral injury is 
because it is associated with the infliction of physical and emotional injuries. 
Hampton flatly rejected this argument. 165 What the retributivist wants to 
achieve is not just ( or even) that the victim feel better, but rather that the false 
statement about the victim's value is 'annulled.' 166 Thus, what is required is a 
response that is connected to "that which makes the wrongful act wrong."167 
What makes moral injury wrong is that it expresses a false claim about the 
value of the victim. The response must express and establish not only that the 
victim has value, but that the value-judgment contained in the wrongdoer's act 
was wrong. For Hampton, the only way to reassert the correct moral status of 
the victim is to punish the wrongdoer: 
When we face actions that not merely express the message that a person 
is degraded relative to the wrongdoer but also try to establish that 
degradation, we are morally required to respond by trying to remake the 
world in a way that denies what the wrongdoer's events have attempted 
to establish, thereby lowering the wrongdoer, elevating the victim, and 
annulling the act of diminishment. 168 
The criticism that Hampton had to answer was why the correction of "moral 
reality" had to come through the imposition of hard treatment on the 
wrongdoer. Why would it not be enough for the state to announce that the 
wrongdoer was, in fact, wrong about the victim's lack of moral equality? As 
Hampton sarcastically put it, "why not simply hold a parade for her?" 169 
Hampton's answer was that punishment of the wrongdoer compensates the 
victim. 170 The wrongdoer's suffering puts the victim "back" to where she was 
163 Id. at 1678. 
164 Id. at 1684. 
165 See FORGIVENESS, supra note 160, at 125. 
166 Id. at 13 I. 
161 Id. 
168 Correcting Harms , supra note 160, at 1686-87 (emphasis added). 
169 Id. at 1695. 
170 Id. at 1698. As Emily Sherwin notes, the motive of retaliation seems to overlap with 
the motive ofretribution in Hampton's work. A victim secures redress through moral defeat 
by making the wrongdoer worse-off. See Emily L. Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust 
Enrichment, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1443, 1456-57 (2004). The difference between retaliation and 
retribution is not necessarily in form but in purpose. Retaliation may be motivated merely 
to eliminate a wrongful gain, whereas retribution is motivated by a desire to correct a 
wrongful loss. 
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before the moral injury was inflicted. 
Hampton's argument for retribution is much more complex than I have 
presented it here. Whether it is ultimately persuasive is not the point of raising 
it in the context of a discussion of Dagan' s argument for the vindicatory power 
of restitution. It is, however, a corrective justice argument with some of the 
same ambitions as Dagan's. Hampton began her analysis at a very different 
point. She did not specify the measure of the penalties that would serve to 
restore victims to their pre-moral injury state.171 Because, for Hampton, the 
victim's moral injury was repaired through an expressive act (the public 
punishment of the wrongdoer), the measure of the penalty was not necessarily 
reflected in the profit gained by the wrongdoer. For Hampton, if the Otwell 
case was an example of retribution in action, it was because of the expressive 
defeat expressed by the loss of profit. The profit itself could not be seen as the 
measure of the moral injury. Thus, even had the defendant made no profit at 
all, there would still be a need to punish him, whether by punitive damages 
directly, or some form of civil or criminal penalty. 
Dagan's first sense of 'vindication' of interference with control seems to 
parallel Hampton's understanding of retribution for moral injury. If indeed it 
follows Hampton's idea, then it is much less likely to run afoul of the 
commodification problem. However, if restitution of profits "vindicates" 
control by expressing to the victim and the wrongdoer that the infringement is 
viewed as a social offense, then the restitutionary act is the reversal of the 
infringement and not the disgorgement of the profits. The disgorgement of the 
profits is just a vehicle or means by which the expression of social 
condemnation is communicated to the plaintiff. It should be noticed that the 
profits, which "measure" recovery for loss of control, are not really a measure 
at all: they are the evidence that the proper kind of notice has occurred. The 
amount of money awarded is contingently determined because the amount of 
profit the infringer produced is a matter of moral luck. Like Hampton's 
punitive damages, the particular quantum of profit, under Dagan's account, 
cannot be defended as being too much or too little, because by definition they 
do not refer back to any particular resource of the plaintiff whose loss has an 
objective welfare value. The practice of awarding profit damages is a legal 
device designed to promote the ends or institution of restitution law without 
utilizing the particular rules ofrestitution law. 172 
171 According to Hampton, punitive damages could be given a non-instrumental 
justification that is, as the repair of moral injury. Correcting Harms, supra note 160, at 
1686 (citing M. Galanter & D. Luban, Poetic Justice: Legal Pluralism and the 
Jurisprudence of Punitive Damages (1989) (unpublished manuscript), subsequently 
published as Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993)). 
172 In this sense, Dagan's account of profit damages in restitution law parallels not only 
Hampton's account of punitive damages as private retribution but also Rawls ' account of 
practices like punishment or promise-keeping. Rawls noted that utilitarian justification of 
these practices must take into account "the distinction between the justification of a practice 
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According to Dagan, the restitution of wealth demanded in the slave 
litigation produces only an "incomplete commodification" of the slaves' claims 
because a portion of the money demanded (the profits) represents the 
vindication of the entitlement to control infringed by the defendants. 173 The 
invocation of Radin's terminology at this point highlights the difficulty with 
Dagan's position. Radin's discussion of tort damages for emotional distress as 
incompletely commodified was fraught with questions about the costs and 
benefits of using market rhetoric to capture incommensurable interests, such as 
the interest to be free of pain. 174 Like Hampton, Radin viewed the practice of 
awarding a quantum of compensation in order to rectify a non-quantifiable 
harm as controversial and in need of justification. Dagan, too, has a 
justification, but his is on slightly less secure ground in the context of using the 
language of restitution to provide redress for the nonmonetizable injuries of 
slavery. 
Like non-economic injuries or punitive damages, the primary argument for 
having them, notwithstanding the dangers of commodification is that a system 
of monetized damage awards is the only way to deliver to the plaintiff the 
expressive or symbolic content contained in the non-commodified portion of 
the award. Money for pain and suffering and punitive damages is typically 
justified instrumentally. Radin and Hampton understood the non-commodified 
portion of these awards not just non-instrumentally, but expressively. Radin 
quoted Louis Jaffe, who suggested that pain and suffering damages were a 
solatium, a payment that "signif[ies] society's sincerity." 175 Hampton 
understood the moral defeat suffered by a defendant who suffered retribution 
as an act that expressed to the plaintiff a specific belief about the plaintiffs 
"real" moral status. Each of these damages practices work (if they work) 
because they communicate to the plaintiff a belief about the plaintiff. This is 
how vindication works within Dagan's model of restitution as well, but can 
this model of damages work if the original subjects of the wrong are dead? 
The point of this question is not to challenge the logical possibility that 
and the justification of a particular action falling under it." JOHN RAWLS, Two CONCEPTS OF 
RULES (1955), reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS 3, 31 (1999). Dagan believes that the 
practice of restitution is characterized by certain principles, such as the rectification of the 
infringement of an entitlement. Where the injury to the infringement is incalculable, the 
proper response is not to abandon the practice of restitution but to reinterpret its practice and 
to justify the reinterpretation "by reference to the practice." RAWLS, supra at 42. 
173 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1151-52 (citing CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 184-91 ). 
174 CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 203 . Radin noted that Richard Abel, a 
progressive torts scholar, recommended doing away with pain and suffering damages 
because they "'commodify our unique experience."' Id. at 203 (quoting Richard Abel, A 
Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REv. 785, 804-06 (1990)). 
175 Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 71 
(1993) (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219,224 (1953)). 
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expressive or symbolic damages can be carried forward by survival actions. 
The old rule of actio persona/is, in which an action in tort dies with the estate, 
has been modified by statute in almost all fifty states. 176 The question, as 
Dagan himself recognizes, is whether the doctrine of restitution, which has not 
been affected by statutory modifications of tort law, should be interpreted by 
the courts to extend to heirs a form of remedy not recognized by common law 
tort_ 111 
When an heir inherits an estate's actions maintained by a state's 
survivorship laws, she is suing in the name of the victim of the tort. 178 This is 
in contrast to wrongful death, where a legislatively designated member of the 
decedent's family sues for damages in her own name. 179 The instrumentalist 
reasons for survivorship statutes are easy to see. From a perspective of 
deterrence, there would be no way to ensure that the full cost of tortious 
conduct would be internalized if some of the costs of that activity were not 
charged to the tortfeasor because his victims died as a result of his acts. There 
may be other instrumentalist reasons relating to the inadequacy of other forms 
of support for the heirs, or the inadequacy of wrongful death as a source of 
compensation, that may justify the survivorship of claims. 
The non-instrumentalist reasons for permitting tort claims to survive the 
death of the plaintiff are rarely articulated. As one author put it, the issue with 
a "survival statute ... is making the decedent's estate whole, not whether the 
decedent's relatives are entitled to any benefit."180 Why should the decedent's 
estate be made whole, if not for the interest of others in receiving the money 
the decedent was to receive from the defendant? It is precisely because of the 
suspicion that the interests of heirs are served by survivorship that most states 
176 See DAN B. DOBBS, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS§ 295 (2001) [hereinafter LAW OF TORTS II]; 
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 52, § 126; Wex s. Malone, The Genesis of 
Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043, 1051 (1965). Virtually all states provide for the 
continuation of tort actions after the death of party who would otherwise have a valid cause 
of action. See infra note I 85. 
177 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1160-61. 
178 See LAW OF TORTS II, supra note 176, § 295 (discussing damages under and the scope 
of survival actions). "In contrast to the wrongful death action, the survival action ... merely 
reverses the common law rule that a cause of action abates with the death of either party." 
Id. at 805. 
179 This often includes loss of the cost of burial and the value of the decedent's future 
estate to the family, as well as the loss of future earnings, the loss of future services, and 
sometimes compensation for the family member's emotional distress. See, e.g., Lorenz v. 
Air Ill., Inc., 522 N.E.2d 1352, 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (listing standard jury instructions 
on loss of estate); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3(a) (McKinney 2004) (allowing 
recovery for burial expenses); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(b)(5) (West 2004) 
(allowing recovery for mental anguish). 
180 Eric W. Gunderson, Personal Injury Damages Under the Maryland Survival Statute: 
Advocating Damage Recovery for a Decedent's Future Lost Earnings, 29 U. BALT. L. REv. 
97, 104 (2001). 
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do not allow future earnings expectancy to be awarded through survivorship, 
on the theory that heirs should (and will) receive a share of the decedent's 
expected earnings through their wrongful death claim.181 Where the decedent 
has no heirs who can collect under a wrongful death action, the risk of double-
recovery is eliminated, but the question remains: Other than deterring the 
defendant, what is the point of allowing recovery? In one case where a court 
allowed future economic Joss to be included in a survivorship claim even 
where there are no heirs who would qualify to collect under a wrongful death 
claim, the court argued that there where other parties with interests in the 
decedent's estate being made whole, namely, "creditors and heirs or devisees" 
not recognized by the wrongful death statute.182 As the Ohio Supreme Court 
noted in its decision rejecting prospective income from survivorship, the 
legislative decision to abandon the common law rule of actio persona/is was 
designed to repair the estate of the decedent by forcing the defendant to pay 
compensation for the "immediate" or "temporal" injury suffered by the 
decedent before he died. 's3 
The major category of damages that is maintained by survivorship rules is 
pain and suffering prior to death. 184 As Dobbs notes, suits for "dignitary torts" 
such as defamation, malicious prosecution, and the right to publicity often do 
not survive death. 185 It is worth considering why, when state legislatures 
181 See Flowers v. Marshall, 494 P.2d 1184 (Kan. 1972); James 0 . Pearson, Jr., 
Annotation, Recovery, in Action for Benefit of Decedent's Estate in Jurisdiction Which Has 
Both Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, of Value of Earnings Decedent Would Have 
Made After Death, 76 A.L.R. 3d 125 (Cum. Supp. 1997). 
182 Criscuola v. Andrews, 507 P.2d 149, 151 (Wash. 1973). 
183 See Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 1955). 
184 See LAW OF TORTS II, supra note 176, § 295. "Damages in the survival action are 
often quite limited in amount. They reflect only the damages the decedent herself could 
have claimed at the moment of her death." Id. Lost earnings post-injury and prior to death 
are a logical possibility but arise more infrequently than pain and suffering and medical 
expenses post-injury. As noted, lost future injuries post-death are not often allowed. 
185 Id. A substantial number of state survival statutes still do not empower a deceased's 
estate to bring a cause of action for a dignitary tort such as libel, slander, false 
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, privacy, or permit punitive damages to be awarded. 
See, e.g., Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1394, 1399 (D. Utah, 1997) (holding that, 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12 (1977), claims of injuries to rights, reputation, or 
property do not survive death); Conly v. Conly, 121 Mass. 550, 550 (1877) (holding that 
actions for malicious prosecution do not survive under the Massachusetts common law); 
Walters v. Nettleton, 59 Mass. 544, 544 (1850) (holding that actions for libel to not survive 
death under the Massachusetts common law); ALA. CODE § 6-5-462 (2004) (excluding 
claims based on injury to reputation); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.570 (Mitchie 2004) (excluding 
defamation); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 14-3110 (2004) (excluding "breach of promise to marry, 
seduction, libel, slander, separate maintenance, alimony, loss of consortium, and invasion of 
right of privacy"); ARK. CODE. ANN.§ 16-62-I0l(a)(2) (Mitchie 2003) (excluding slander 
and libel); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-20-101 (2003) (excluding actions for libel and slander); 
HAW. REv. STAT.§ 663-7 (2003) (excluding defamation and malicious prosecution); IDAHO 
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decided to extend tort actions past death, they often decided not to include 
dignitary damages such as reputation. 186 Another way of framing the question 
is: Why have legislatures so often excluded dignitary injuries from the 
category of "temporal" harm? From an instrumental perspective, one could 
see certain social benefits to forcing wrongdoers to compensate for the injuries 
resulting from dignitary wrongs; one would hope that such wrongdoing would 
be discouraged. 
One explanation for the hesitancy to include dignitary harms in the category 
of temporal harms is that, despite the instrumental benefits of deterrence and 
compensation that come with any form of damage award associated with 
antisocial conduct, there is a certain conceptual incoherence to the idea of 
symbolic or expressive redress for nonmonetizable interests when the party 
who is repaired is an "estate" instead of the natural person whose dignity was 
injured. If the purpose of using monetized damages is to (however 
incompletely) communicate to the victim that the wrong they have suffered has 
been identified and corrected, then the point of this interpretation of the 
practice of awarding damages seems lost when the victim is dead. Of course, 
if one took the viewpoint that any type of injury that is compensable through 
private law is a commodity, then the death of the victim after the wrong 
occurred but before the remedy could be provided is irrelevant. Our common 
law takes this view with regard to property and contract but not with regard to 
tort. The son of a man who was owed money because he was not paid for his 
labor should be able to press that claim in quantum meruit after his father's 
CODE § 5-327 (Mitchie 2004) (excluding slander and libel); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-6 
(2004) (excluding slander and libel); IND. CODE § 34-9-3-l(a) (2004) (excluding libel, 
slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and personal 
injuries to the deceased party); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41 l.140 (Mitchie 2004) (excluding 
slander, libel, criminal conversion, and malicious prosecution pertaining to the personal 
injury); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 228, § 1 (2004) (providing for survival of certain actions, but 
maintaining the common law exceptions of malicious prosecution and libel); NEB. REv. 
STAT. § 25-1402 (2003) (excluding libel, slander, malicious prosecution, assault, assault and 
battery, and nuisance); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 556:15 (2003) (excluding actions for 
recovery of penalties and forfeitures of money under penal statutes); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
28A-18-l(b) (2004) (excluding libel, slander (with the exception of slander of title), and 
false imprisonment); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-01-26.1 (2003) (excluding breach of promise, 
alienation of affections, libel, and slander); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (2004) (excluding 
actions for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1452 
(2004) (providing for survivorship of actions to damages for "bodily hurt or injury"). Some 
courts have abolished limitations on the survivorship of tort claims because they treat some 
tort victims unequally compared to others. See Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 408 (Pa. 
1975) (holding that exclusion of survivorship for defamation claims under Pennsylvania 
survivorship statute was unconstitutional); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 
407 (Minn. 1982) (holding that exclusion of survivorship for claims of intentional tort was 
unconstitutional). 
186 See generally Luke Degrand, Challenging the Exclusion of Libel and Slander from 
Survival Statutes, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 423, 426 (1984). 
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death, assuming that all other statute of limitations questions were not at issue. 
The son, however, does not automatically inherit his father's claims in tort, as 
if they were property to be handed down. Any right to a remedy relating to his 
father's money that he might have inherited or been given would be grounded 
not on the son inheriting the father's tort claim, but on the son gaining a tort 
claim of his own as a result of his father's death (e.g. under his state's 
wrongful death statute). 
The structure of private law suggests remedies that redress commodifiable 
losses can be passed between generations somewhat easily, while remedies that 
redress noncommodifiable interests can pass between generations only as the 
result of some considered effort, usually involving legislation. 187 This is not an 
argument in itself for denying that the original slaves had claims in restitution, 
or that if they had been in possession of such claims, those claims could in 
theory descend to their children and their children's children, subject to the 
constraints of the applicable rules of statutes of limitations. It also is not an 
argument against the claim that if the slaves had brought a suit in restitution, 
their damages would have included profits. It is an argument about how we 
should interpret the reason why the slaves would have had a claim in 
restitution. If the reason is, as Dagan has argued, that the claim in restitution 
was to rectify the loss of control by means of awarding symbolic damages, 
then we are faced with a dilemma. One the one hand, we can accept Dagan's 
characterization of the rationale for the restitution of profits. The problem with 
doing so is that we would then be forced to permit the descent of symbolic 
damages without statutory authority, with the full knowledge that they would 
not even be able to achieve the ends that provide the rationale for having 
incompletely commodified remedies. In the alternative, we could refuse to 
allow the claims to be inherited, not just because of concerns with statutes of 
limitations, but because we feel the risk of comodification is too large. Dagan 
acknowledges that the second choice might be preferable on the balance of 
policy reasons. 188 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I have argued that lawyers should be discouraged from 
adopting the categories and language of restitution to address the wrongs of 
slavery. My view is not that the wrongs of slavery cannot be addressed in the 
language of private law. American slavery can be analyzed through the lens of 
187 The descendability of claims for the "temporal injury" of pain and suffering is 
explicable partly because it is the result of a legislative act. Pain and suffering damages, 
which cannot ever truly repair what a victim has lost, are already monetized for a variety of 
reasons by the tort system, as Radin noted. See supra notes 122- I 37 and accompanying text. 
The decision to fully commodify them by making them part of an estate's "interest" in a 
survivorship action only underscores the extent to which the commodification of certain 
non-monetizable injuries is a step that requires careful justification. 
188 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1163-64. 
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tort law, although it has its own perils, and once the question of legal redress is 
properly framed, the correct answer to the correct question will disappoint and 
frustrate those who seek justice in the courts. The purpose of this article is to 
suggest that the language of tort law should be adequate for a complete 
analysis of the compensation of the dignitary injuries caused by slavery. 189 
My argument against adopting the language of restitution is partially a 
matter of comparative institutional competence - tort law can make more sense 
of the real non-commodified injury at the root of the slave litigation - and 
partially a matter of guesswork about the unanticipated consequences of 
changing the language of restitution. The real question is not whether claims 
for unjust enrichment have taken into account conduct that, as Dagan has 
argued, interferes with the interest in the control of oneself. It clearly has. The 
question the slavery cases raise is whether lawyers should choose to treat an 
injury to this interest as a contingent or essential feature of the plaintiffs' rights 
to restitution. To the extent that lawyers are encouraged to do this because 
they find tort law unsatisfactory due to technical or practical issues, the flight 
to restitution to avoid these problems will not provide a more stable or safer 
haven. 
189 For this reason, Hylton's article in this symposium offers a very thoughtful 
reconsideration of the interests injured as a result of slavery and the potential for framing 
new claims for redress under the existing common law of tort. See generally Hylton, supra 
note 71. 
